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Staff: Angela Knight

The Independent Commission on Banking: six weeks on

written by Angela Knight on 24/10/2011

The Independent Commission on Banking made its final report last month. As the Government considers what action to take, it must be remembered that the ICB is a body that recommends, not a body that decides. 

Nevertheless, the Commission’s intentions are worthy ones: to guard against future crisis through extensive reform of the industry, while protecting a banking system that is effective, efficient and secure for its customers. To achieve this, the ICB proposes a retail ring-fence, more loss absorbing capital and more competition in retail banking. I’ll focus my attention here on those first two propositions.

There are already requirements for banks in the UK to follow recovery and resolution plans. The retail ring-fence is quite a different proposition.  It may well reduce a retail entity’s exposure to untenable losses in the wider group. But that firewall comes at the cost of upping organisational complexity – this could be detrimental for business customers in more ‘normal’ times. And whilst life may still be uncomfortable at present, periods of normality are far more usual than times of crisis.

With a ring-fence in place, the bank loses the benefits of diversification. This can work against financial stability, reinforcing the tendency of retail and small business lending to be procyclical in nature. Moreover, the UK experience of financial crisis was that losses weren't principally in the wholesale area, rather from retail and commercial lending. The banks that got into difficulty did so by way of classically bad banking practice: lending too much to the wrong people at the wrong price.

What happens elsewhere is important if the UK proceeds down the ring-fence route. For instance, the ICB’s recommendations don’t line up with US separation requirements under Dodd Frank’s Volcker Rule. If countries follow the UK, this will lead to trapped pools of capital and liquidity and reduce the open market for capital finance. This means that in good times, lending capacity will be reduced; in bad times, the ability of banking groups to respond to financial problems will suffer.

Or other countries might not follow the UK lead. As a result, cheaper retail and wholesale services can be passported into the UK from outside without the constraints of a ring-fence. It must always be kept in mind that a ring-fence serves negative purpose if business moves from UK banks to non-UK banks and if the costs and complexity for the very customers it seeks to protect are increased.

Moving on to the proposed increase in loss-absorbing capital, an increase that is far greater than that required by international standard setters. Basel III requires seven per cent, plus a little more in certain circumstances. The UK variant calls for up to ten per cent: banks should hold 17 per cent of loss-absorbing capital, plus up to another three per cent. So at 20 per cent, these recommendations are more or less double the international standard.

Will this make the system more stable? The answer is possibly yes. But again, there is a cost. Some theoretical calculations show that, apparently, it will not cost the industry that much more to fund itself to these levels. Few believe these calculations will pass the test of practice.

I sincerely hope that the investors will be up for the ICB’s proposals. But if they are, I say again that costs will be big. Run up all the associated price tags and the fixed cost of operating a bank will be much higher.  As every businessman and woman knows, you can’t increase the fixed cost of commerce without affecting the price of the goods and services that the business offers. 

On the other hand, if investors aren’t behind the ICB, then the industry will have to deleverage further. That starts to reduce banks' ability to lend. And we all know how difficult and divisive an issue that is already.

Just thinking about putting the ICB’s recommendations into practice isn’t easy. The report’s proposals require clear and careful cost, benefit and impact studies. We have to assess their effects on our economy and we have to appreciate what it is that we really want as a nation.

1 Comments

written by Ralph Musgrave on 12/11/2011

There are several farcical elements in the ICB’s report. One concerns the “retail ring fence” to which Angela Knight refers. The word “retail” refers to stuff sold to the final customer: the consumer. But deposits by and loans to companies large and small are included in the “retail ring fence”!

A bank account held by a private individual is “retail”, but a bank account held by a company certainly isn’t. Moreover, allowing genuine retail money to be loaned to companies is incompatible with the ICB’s declared aim of insulating essential money transfer activities (which cannot be allowed to fail) from risky activities. As Angela Knight points out, it was sloppy lending practices (to companies amongst others) that largely caused the problem. The ICB has put chickens and foxes inside the same ringfence.

Worse still, mortgages are included in the ring fence. Er . . . wasn’t it irresponsible NINJA mortgages that were one of the main causes of the credit crunch?

The issues here are far too complicated to deal with in a comment on a blog, but certainly I smell a number of rats in the “retail ring fence”.

As regards Angela Knight’s “anti ICB” points, I don’t buy her argument that the ICB’s proposals would “up organisational complexity” in banks which would be “detrimental for business customers in more ‘normal’ times”. Imposing regulations on banks does not mean problems for bank customers: it just means the latter will tend to go for alternative sources of funding, including equity funding. And ensuring that everyone has a bit more cash in their bank account so that they can go for equity funding rather than bank funding is easily arranged. As Milton Friedman put it, “It need cost society essentially nothing in real resources to provide the individual with the current services of an additional dollar in cash balances.”

Re Angela Knight’s point about “trapped pools of liquidity”, that point is also put in check mate by Friedman’s above point. Indeed I would advocate much bigger “trapped pools of liquidity” than even the ICB proposes. That is I agree with proposals put to the ICB by Prof R.A.Werner and the New Economics Foundation, which included the idea that it should be illegal to let money in accounts which is supposedly 100% safe to be invested. 

Indeed, Mervyn King referred to the idea that risky investments can be funded by allegedly risk free deposits as “alchemy”.

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